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INTRODUCTION
After Wilbur was found guilty, there was no questioning his immediate future. The executioner led the convicted criminal to the public square near city
hall, where he would be formally put to death before a crowd. His actions were
truly depraved; the tribunal had found Wilbur guilty of killing a child in a particularly gruesome manner. The tribunal had sentenced Wilbur to be tortured
and hanged for his crime. The torture would be of the same nature as that he
committed: mutilation and dismemberment. The sentence was carried out: the
executioner with a new pair of gloves, the defendant in a new set of clothes, all
paid for at the public’s expense.
* Student at William S. Boyd School of Law.

992

Spring 2015]

FREE WILL IS NO BARGAIN

993

This may seem like a barbaric punishment to impose upon Wilbur. Indeed,
the punishment was a clear application of lex talionis—the “retributive principle of taking an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.”1 Today, the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has unquestionably helped foster a society
that repudiates such primitive punishments.2 However, many laymen and
scholars alike still believe that someone like Wilbur deserves to suffer for his
wrongdoing and that desires for revenge are both just and moral.3 After all,
how can it be that he could exact such mental anguish upon the family, or such
physical pain upon the child, and not have to experience such suffering himself? How would we feel about Wilbur if he had taken our child’s life?
It may not surprise you to learn that Wilbur’s story is true; the trial and execution occurred in 1386 in Falaise, France.4 However, an important element
has been omitted from the story: Wilbur was not man, but rather, an ordinary
French pig.5 Had you initially known this, would your reaction towards Wilbur’s punishment have been the same? Does the pig really deserve to suffer for
his crime? Although we want to protect other children by containing the pig,
does one feel a need to exact revenge on the pig?
The criminal prosecution of animals is no stranger to history,6 but today it
seems like the sentencing of animals is peculiar, if not entirely absurd. So why
is it we no longer feel the need to punish animals formally for their wrongdoings? For the same reason that we are hesitant to punish the insane: we do not
believe the actor had the capacity to “choose” to engage in his or her criminal
behavior.7 That is to say, animals “have no alternative but to conform with the
1

E.P. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS 140
(1906).
2
The Eighth Amendment states in its entirety, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend
VIII. The United States Supreme Court has stated that this amendment prohibits “punishments of torture, . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty,” such as disemboweling, beheading, quartering, dissecting, and burning alive, all of which share “the deliberate infliction of pain for the sake of pain.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48 (2008).
3
See Steven Eisenstat, Revenge, Justice and Law: Recognizing the Victim’s Desire for
Vengeance as a Justification for Punishment, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1115, 1135 (2004)
(“[P]unishments which include an element of suffering are just, and [] it is also moral for a
society to mete out criminal punishment for the purpose of causing the wrong doer to experience suffering.”).
4
EVANS, supra note 1. However, “Wilbur” was not the actual name of the pig (I can only
presume), and the pig was female rather than male. Id.
5
And yes, the pig was dressed up in human clothing. Id.
6
See generally id. (describing the history of the criminal prosecution of animals).
7
See Brian D. Shannon, The Time Is Right to Revise the Texas Insanity Defense: An Essay,
39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 67, 72–73 (2006) (“In general, behavior is the product of choice, and
people who make bad choices are subject to moral condemnation. In cases where mental disease or defect robs people of the capacity to choose not to engage in criminal behavior, the
argument concludes, it is inappropriate to condemn them morally and therefore inappropriate
to convict them of a crime.”). Another reason why we do not hold trials for animals is a diminished belief in demonic possession. See EVANS, supra note 1, at 4–8 (noting the church’s
general belief in demonic possession throughout the Middle Ages). However, as it was likely
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promptings of their genetically implanted instincts. Thus, we do not subject
them to moral praise or blame.”8
Although scholars have long argued, and will surely continue to argue,
what it means to have “free will,” it seems clear that most people, most of the
time, equate free will with an ability to “choose” among alternatives.9 As biologist Jerry Coyne phrases it, “if you could rerun the tape of your life up to the
moment you make a choice, with every aspect of the universe configured identically, free will means that your choice could have been different.”10 Without
the ability to choose between different actions, punishing animals or the insane
simply because they deserve it seems to make less moral sense, and our focus
tends to shift towards preventing harm from occurring and away from inflicting
suffering on the actor that caused the harm. But what if you and I were in the
same position as Wilbur: unable to act except as the neurochemistry of our
brains, which we are wholly unaware of, leads us to act? Would a moral and
just legal system punish us—purely for vengeance’s sake—for something beyond our control?
This Note explores the relationship between the concept of free will, our
ever-growing science of the mind, and the law. Part I discusses the concept of
free will and argues that a scientific understanding of human behavior conflicts
with the majority’s view of free will. Part II examines the role the popular conception of free will has played in our legal structure, focusing on notions of
blame, moral responsibility, and retribution, and argues that we must dispense
with retribution as a theory of punishment. Part III addresses common concerns
with this proposal, and argues that our criminal justice system need not undergo
any substantial changes to reflect a modern understanding of human behavior.
I.

DO YOU CHOOSE TO THINK WHAT YOU THINK?

A. The Definition of Free Will
Free will has been a subject of debate for over two millennia.11 As a result,
the philosophical arguments on this subject are nuanced and have generated an
believed that demons exercised free will in taking control of animals, this diminished belief
in demonic possession coincides with the belief that animals do not operate freely.
8
Hugh Miller, III, DNA Blueprints, Personhood, and Genetic Privacy, 8 HEALTH MATRIX
179, 217 (1998).
9
Emad H. Atiq, How Folk Beliefs About Free Will Influence Sentencing: A New Target for
the Neuro-Determinist Critics of Criminal Law, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 449, 475 (2013); Luis
E. Chiesa, Punishing Without Free Will, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1403, 1410 (2011); Melissa
Burkley, Is Free Will a Magic Trick?, HUFF POST TED WEEKENDS (Feb. 19,
2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/melissa-burkley-phd/is-free-will-a-mag
ic-tric_b_4467625.html; see infra Part I.A (discussing the definition of free will).
10
Jerry A. Coyne, You Don’t Have Free Will, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 18, 2012),
http://chronicle.com/article/Jerry-A-Coyne/131165/.
11
Timothy O’Connor, Free Will, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 29, 2010),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/freewill/.
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immense amount of scholarly work.12 Thus, when the subject arises, several
different interpretations of “free will” may come to mind.13 For example, some
identify free will with freedom of action; we have free will as long as we are
not coerced or restrained from acting in accord with our own desires (even if
we do not choose those desires).14 Thus, if we want to go to the gym, and nothing is stopping us from going (or forcing us to go) to the gym, then our going to
the gym is proof positive of free will.15
However, this definition ignores the principal reason why the notion of free
will is so widely accepted: most of us feel that “we are the conscious source of
our thoughts and actions.”16 Not only can we act in accord with our will, but it
seems like we are able to will what we will.17 That is to say, we do not feel as if
all our desires and actions are determined by prior causes and events. Not only
are we aware of our desires, we feel like we are consciously controlling our desires. It also seems like we choose whether to act in accord with our desires.
For example, if we deliberate on whether to go to the gym, and reasons come to
mind that lead us towards one decision over the other, it feels like we are in
complete control of our thoughts: that we are choosing to bring our thoughts
into existence, rather than simply witnessing their arrival for reasons beyond
our control. As a result, it feels as if we have made a choice to deliberate on the
matter, not that a choice has been made for us.
Studies have shown that most people’s understanding of human action is
significantly different from that revealed through cognitive science.18 For example, one study had participants give reactions to two similar vignettes.19 In
both scenarios, a device was continually delivering electric shocks to a rat in an
experiment. There was also a power button that, if pressed, would stop the electric shocks to the rat. In the first scenario, a computer had a robotic hand that
was positioned next to the button. The computer had the information that if it
pressed the button, the shocks would stop. However, all of the computer’s
software instructions and programming code directed it not to press the button.

12
See generally BOB DOYLE, FREE WILL: THE SCANDAL IN PHILOSOPHY (2011), available at
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/books/Free_Will_Scandal.pdf (discussing the “history of the free will problem”).
13
See generally id. (discussing the “taxonomy of free will positions”).
14
This is the definition usually promulgated by compatibilists. Id. at 157; SAM HARRIS,
FREE WILL 16 (2012).
15
This example is modeled after an example given by Sam Harris. HARRIS, supra note 14.
16
Id. at 16–17; see Atiq, supra note 9, at 450.
17
HARRIS, supra note 14, at 39 n.16. This sentiment originally comes from 19th century
German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. See ILHAM DILMAN, FREE WILL: AN HISTORICAL
AND PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 165–66 (1999). Einstein also shared this sentiment with
Schopenhauer. HARRIS, supra note 14, at 39 n.16.
18
See Atiq, supra note 9, at 474–75 (citing multiple studies examining the commonsense
“folk” notion of free will).
19
Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols, Free Will and the Bounds of the Self, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 550–51 (Robert Kane ed., 2011); see Atiq, supra note 9.

996

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:992

In the second scenario, the computer is swapped for a person. This person
is also aware that if he presses the button, the electric shocks will cease. However, it is stipulated that all of the person’s “desires and urges—both conscious
and unconscious” are not to press the button.20
The participants were asked whether they agreed with the following two
statements: (1) “Even though all of [the computer’s] software and programming
code are not to [press the button], it is still possible that [the computer] will
[press the button];” and (2) “Even though all of [the person’s] urges, desires,
thoughts, etc., are not to [press the button], it is still possible that [the person]
will [press the button].”21 The results were predictable—people generally disagreed with the former and agreed with the latter.22
Whereas the scientific picture suggests that our actions are the result of determined mental states and processes, the public’s understanding generally entails “something more—a separate self that stands outside all these states and
processes and can choose to ignore their promptings.”23 Thus, it appears that
“the popular conception of free will consists of two assumptions: (1) that each
of us could have behaved differently than we did in the past, and (2) that we are
the conscious source of most of our thoughts and actions in the present.”24
B. The Principal Philosophical Positions on Free Will
This notion of free will embodies the philosophical position known as “libertarianism.”25 Libertarianism holds that human agency—that is, the capacity
for human beings to make choices—is not bound to physical causality, and is
therefore free and undetermined.26 In contrast with libertarianism, “determinism” is the philosophical position that our decisions are controlled by background causes (prior events, prior conditions, and the laws of nature).27 Under a
deterministic viewpoint, if you could rewind the “tape of your life” to the moment before you made a decision, the same outcome would occur because the
same underlying causes would govern your behavior.28 Libertarianism and determinism are referred to as “incompatibilist” views, as each holds that there is
no way for the two to coexist.29 If our will is fully determined by a chain of
20

Knobe & Nichols, supra note 19, at 550.
Id. at 550–51.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 551; Atiq, supra note 9.
24
HARRIS, supra note 14, at 6.
25
3 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 745–46 (Edward Craig ed., 1998). It should
be noted that philosophical libertarianism has no relation to political libertarianism. Joshua
Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything,
359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1775, 1776 (2004); HARRIS, supra note 14, at 15.
26
HARRIS, supra note 14, at 15–16.
27
Carl Hoefer, Causal Determinism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/determinism-causal/.
28
Coyne, supra note 10.
29
HARRIS, supra note 14, at 15.
21
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events leading back to our birth and beyond, the libertarian notion of free will
is an illusion.30 “Compatibilists” do not operate using the libertarian definition
of free will, but rather define free will as being synonymous with freedom of
action.31 Under this definition, compatibilists believe that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive.32 While these are the general philosophical
positions within the free will debate, each one of these positions has several
subdivisions within it.
FIGURE 1: “A TAXONOMY OF FREE WILL POSITIONS”33

As the non-exhaustive diagram above illustrates, philosophers have been hard
at work discussing and labeling their different theories on the issue of free will.
This Note will not discuss in detail the nuances among the various philosophical theories, but rather will focus on the popular conception of free will as defined in Part I.A, as this is the problematic and commonly held notion of free
will that so often influences our laws and legal structure.34 However, it is useful
to note the general differences between determinism and compatibilism, as Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court have made similar arguments in other contexts.35

30

Id.
DOYLE, supra note 12, at 157.
32
HARRIS, supra note 14; DOYLE, supra note 12, at 157.
33
The diagram is adapted from Bob Doyle’s book, Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy.
DOYLE, supra note 12, at 63.
34
This is for two primary reasons: (1) this note is not intended to be a comprehensive philosophical article, and (2) for the sanity of most readers, whose minds grow numb with the addition of each philosophical term of art.
35
See infra Part II.A.
31
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C. The Objective Argument: Your Brain is the Boss
The libertarian notion that one’s thoughts and actions are divorced from
causal events, and that at any moment we are free to choose our behavior, has
become an untenable philosophical argument. Aside from the lack of scientific
evidence to support the notion,36 we now know that unconscious neural events
inform our decision-making.37 If they did not, then changes to our brain’s
chemistry would not have an effect upon our choices. However, it turns out that
even small changes to our brain’s chemistry can have a drastic effect on our
behavior.38 For example, when otherwise normal Parkinson’s patients were exposed to a drug that caused an imbalance in dopamine levels, several of them
became pathological gamblers.39 These patients engaged in their new addiction
by spending an inordinate amount of money on online poker, and by flying to
Las Vegas where one man lost over $200,000 gambling at various casinos.40
In fact, everything about you—your personality,
FIGURE 2: PHINEAS
your desires, your sexual orientation, and so on—is the
41
G
AGE’S SKULL AND
way it is because of the structure of your brain. Several
THE IRON ROD
examples from medical literature suggest that each of
these traits is subject to change given the requisite changes to your brain. One fascinating and well-known case is
that of Phineas Gage, a healthy twenty-five-year-old railroad foreman who had a three-foot-seven-inch, thirteenpound metal rod pass through his head due to a rather unfortunate explosion that occurred while he was preparing
to blast rock for a roadbed.42 Amazingly, Gage was conscious and able to speak within minutes of the accident,
despite the fact that the rod had taken a sizable portion of
his brain with it.43 Gage retained his cognitive faculties
and lived for twelve years after the accident.44 However,
Gage seemed to become another person entirely; he was
much more obstinate, impatient, and capricious, and close
friends stated he was “no longer Gage.”45
36

Atiq, supra note 9, at 450 n.1.
HARRIS, supra note 14; David Eagleman, The Brain on Trial, ATLANTIC, Jul./Aug. 2011,
at 112, 114.
38
Eagleman, supra note 37, at 115.
39
Dopamine is a neurotransmitter that affects our decision-making. Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 114. This will be demonstrated through several examples.
42
JOHN M. HARLOW, RECOVERY FROM THE PASSAGE OF AN IRON BAR THROUGH THE HEAD 4
(1869).
43
Id. at 5.
44
Id. at 15–16; Steven K. Erickson, Blaming the Brain, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 27, 47
(2010).
45
HARLOW, supra note 42, at 13–14; accord Erickson, supra note 44.
37
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Another interesting example involves a forty-year-old husband who developed a sudden and overwhelming interest in child pornography.46 As this new
sexual preference was developing, the man complained of worsening headaches.47 After being found guilty of child molestation charges, the man underwent a brain scan that revealed a massive tumor in his orbitofrontal cortex (a
section of the brain believed to be responsible for decision-making mechanisms).48 The tumor was removed, and the man’s sexual appetite returned to
normal.49 A year after his brain surgery, his pedophilic behavior returned, and
doctors discovered that a portion of the brain tumor had been overlooked in the
previous surgery.50 After neurosurgeons removed the remaining tumor, the
man’s behavior once again returned to normal.51 There are also documented instances of brain infections causing an individual’s sexual orientation to
change.52
The purpose of these examples is to illustrate that “human behavior cannot
be separated from human biology.”53 Even your genes alone can provide information about the behaviors in which you are more or less likely to engage.
In fact, just by knowing that you are genetically male (i.e., that you have a Y
chromosome), we know that the probability you will commit a violent crime
increases about 882 percent over that of a genetic female.54 The precise structure of your brain is what allows you to resist, or fail to resist, the next impulse
that arises. If you resist the urge to order dessert after dinner, this display of
“willpower” does not reveal any free choice. If your brain had been different in
that exact moment, you would not have been able to resist the urge, and this
would also have been through no choice of your own. If your brain were in yet
another state, perhaps you would never have felt the urge to begin with. Is this
something you would be able to take credit for? Have you chosen not to feel
the urge to go gambling right now?
Neuroscience now suggests that our brains make “decisions” before we become consciously aware of them.55 Physiologist Benjamin Libet conducted a
46
Jeffrey M. Burns & Russell H. Swerdlow, Right Orbitofrontal Tumor with Pedophilia
Symptom and Constructional Apraxia Sign, 60 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 437, 437 (2003); Eagleman, supra note 37.
47
Eagleman, supra note 37.
48
Id.; see also Carmen Cavada & Wolfram Schultz, The Mysterious Orbitofrontal Cortex:
Foreword, 10 CEREBRAL CORTEX 205 (2000) (summarizing the findings of studies on the
functions of the orbitofrontal cortex).
49
Eagleman, supra note 37.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See Bruce L. Miller et al., Hypersexuality or Altered Sexual Preference Following Brain
Injury, 49 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 867, 869–70 (1986).
53
Eagleman, supra note 37 at 115.
54
DAVID EAGLEMAN, INCOGNITO: THE SECRET LIVES OF THE BRAIN 158–59 (2011).
55
See Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act,
106 BRAIN 623, 623 (1983).
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notable experiment whereby subjects hooked to an EEG56 were asked to perform simple, voluntary motor acts (e.g., flex your fingers) at the time of their
choosing, and to record the moment at which they became aware of their decision.57 His results showed that the brain had undergone processes indicating a
decision to move some several hundred milliseconds before the subjects reported the appearance of a conscious intention to perform the specific act.58 Interestingly, Libet was not trying to disprove the existence of free will through his
experiments. Rather, Libet believed that humans did have free will and that
there was some action people could take that did not have any unconscious
neural causal precursors.59 This experiment has also been conducted by measuring brain activity with fMRI,60 and the results have shown that “the outcome
of a decision can be encoded in brain activity of prefrontal and parietal cortex
up to 10 [seconds] before it enters awareness.”61
This research seems to leave little room for free will, as it opens up the
possibility that someone else could theoretically know every choice you are going to make before you do.62 Neuroscientist and philosopher Sam Harris illustrates this with the example of a “perfect neuroimaging device.”63 A device that
could perfectly detect even the subtlest changes in brain function would allow
an experimenter to continually report what a subject was going to think and do
throughout the day all while the subject still felt free to choose what he was going to do.64 Therefore, no matter how much it feels like we are consciously authoring our thoughts and actions, it appears that our brain is the boss.

56

Electroencephalography (or EEG) is the “measurement of electrical potential differences
across points on the scalp using sensitive equipment. These small potential differences are
the result of electrical activity within the brain and are associated with brain function.” Learn
More About tDCS / EEG, NEUROELECTRICS, http://www.neuroelectrics.com/software/ (last
visited June 23, 2015).
57
Libet et al., supra note 55, at 624–25.
58
Id. at 635–36.
59
Stanley Klein, Libet’s Research on the Timing of Conscious Intention to Act: A Commentary, 11 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 273, 276 (2002).
60
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (or fMRI) is a relatively new type of brain scan
that observes “blood flow in the brain to detect areas of activity,” through the use of radio
waves and strong magnetic fields. Stephanie Watson, How fMRI Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://science.howstuffworks.com/fmri.htm (last visited May 13, 2015).
61
Chun Siong Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human
Brain, 11 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 543, 543 (2008).
62
It should be noted that even if there were no gap in time between our brain’s activity and
our subjective awareness of the impulse, a libertarian notion of free will would still not make
philosophical or scientific sense, because we would still be unable to control when the impulse arises and what the impulse entails. Thus, an argument against the popular conception
of free will is by no means predicated on Libet’s experiments being scientifically sound.
HARRIS, supra note 14, at 9.
63
Id. at 10.
64
Id. at 10–11.
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D. The Subjective Argument: Witnessing Your Experience
This section encourages you, the reader, to reflect upon the nature of
thought, and provides some thought experiments to guide you along the way.
Although it feels like we control our thoughts, beliefs, and desires, some introspection on this point can also reveal the cognitive illusion. Is your belief really
subject to your will? Try this first experiment: take something you know to be
true (perhaps the fact that George Washington was the first president of the
United States), and see if you can genuinely change your belief.65 You will
likely find yourself hostage to your belief.66 This should expose an important
characteristic about your experience; you cannot change your mind, your mind
can only change you.67 The fact is, some neural event—which you exercise no
control over—is required for you to change your belief about Washington, and
this neural event itself can only be brought about by prior events (neural and
external) over which you also have no control. If you did have the freedom to
change your beliefs in this way, negative emotions such as depression and sadness would be much easier to overcome, as one could simply change his or her
beliefs that were giving rise to the emotion in the first place.
The truth of our circumstance is hidden in plain sight; thoughts simply appear in consciousness, and we cannot control which thoughts are promoted to
consciousness.68 As Dr. Harris states, having this control would require that we
“think [our thoughts], before we think them.”69 To illustrate this, try this
thought experiment: among all of the cities you know of, select one, and observe what this conscious process is like.70 This should be as free a choice as
one can make. After you have settled on one, disregard it, and think of another
city. Once you have decided on a new city, reflect on what this process was like
yet again. Were you free to choose any city you wanted? What about the cities
you are aware of, but whose names did not occur to you to pick? Perhaps London, Paris, and Tokyo came to mind, but perhaps Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Nashville were not forthcoming. Did you choose not to have Tel Aviv arise in
thought? “Were you free to choose that which did not occur to you to
choose?”71
If you pay close enough attention, you can notice that we no more control
the inner workings of our brains than we do the functioning of our livers.72 Although this may appear controversial, there are times where many would con65

SAM HARRIS, THE MORAL LANDSCAPE: HOW SCIENCE CAN DETERMINE HUMAN VALUES
139 (2010).
66
Id.
67
HARRIS, supra note 14, at 37–38.
68
Skeptic Magazine, Sam Harris on “Free Will”, YOUTUBE, at 12:30 (Mar. 27, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pCofmZlC72g.
69
Id. at 14:00.
70
This example is from a lecture given by Dr. Harris. Id. at 19:05.
71
Id. at 21:18.
72
See Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1404.
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cede this is so. Imagine the following situation: a twenty-five-year-old, upstanding student (former Eagle Scout, former marine) kills thirteen people in a
shooting rampage at his university’s campus.73 After the incident, the police
discover a suicide note, where the killer has requested that an autopsy be performed to see if his recent “overwhelming violent impulses” were the result of
changes to his brain.74 During the subsequent autopsy, it is discovered that the
student had developed a tumor that was pressing against his amygdala, which is
a portion of the brain that regulates fear and aggression.75 There is little doubt
that the tumor was a proximate cause of the student’s actions.
This story may sound familiar to you; the student was Charles Whitman
(the “Texas Tower Sniper”), and the incident occurred in 1966.76 The existence
of Whitman’s brain tumor seems to absolve him of responsibility. He certainly
did not choose to have a brain tumor, nor could he choose how the brain tumor
impacted his behavior. He appears to have been profoundly unlucky; to be a
mere “victim of biology.”77 However, a brain tumor is simply an easy way to
identify why your thoughts and actions were as they were.78 If we could clearly
identify why a murderer without a brain tumor acted as he did (perhaps his
brain’s neurophysiology was such that he lacked empathy for others and had an
irascible temperament), such a discovery would be as exculpatory as the brain
tumor.79 While it is unfortunate for Whitman that he developed a brain tumor,
he will at least be remembered in a sympathetic light due to the tumor; any
criminal who behaves in a similarly abhorrent manner without such a salient
sign of illness will be remembered as a monster, although equally “in control”
of his thoughts and actions.
Although we notice changes in our day-to-day experience, we are completely unaware of, and do not exercise control over, the neurophysiological
events that produce those changes.80 Thus, thoughts arise in consciousness unauthored, and we are unable to “choose” their contents or arrival. However,

73

Eagleman, supra note 37, at 112, 114.
Id. at 114.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 112.
77
HARRIS, supra note 14, at 53–54.
78
Id. at 5.
79
Id.
80
HARRIS, supra note 65, at 103. I have avoided using labels to describe the philosophical
position described throughout most of this article, as I fear such terms are more likely to turn
off readers than to actually promote the transfer of ideas. However, for those who are interested, the position argued for in this article is most closely aligned with Hard Incompatibilism. This article does not suggest that strict determinism is true, and that every possible
event (including neural events) is necessarily predictable. Quantum indeterminacy may provide for some randomness on the molecular level, thereby interrupting a pure chain of cause
and effect; however, the addition of any degree of randomness does not offer support for the
popular conception of free will, as randomness still would not allow one to choose their
thoughts or actions.
74

Spring 2015]

FREE WILL IS NO BARGAIN

1003

most people do not view this as the case. As a result, the libertarian attitude towards human behavior continues to influence our legal system.
II. FREE WILL AND THE LAW
A. Legal Recognition of Free Will
The notion of free will seems to touch upon many aspects of our lives. It is
considered a central “tenet of Judeo-Christian morality” and the basis for holding people accountable for their actions.81 It also seems to bear upon “feelings
of guilt and personal accomplishment,” and what P.F. Strawson calls “participant reactive attitudes.”82 Given its widespread acceptance and impression, it
seems all but inevitable that the notion of free will has influenced our laws and
legal structure in various ways.
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed free will, stating that individuals
have an “ability and duty . . . to choose between good and evil,” and that the
recognition of human free will is “universal and persistent in mature systems of
law.”83 The Court has even contrasted free will with a “deterministic view of
human conduct that is inconsistent with the underlying precepts of our criminal
justice system.”84 Justice Scalia, the longest-serving current justice on the
Court, has echoed the most common understanding of free will, stating:
Besides being less likely to regard death as an utterly cataclysmic punishment, the Christian is also more likely to regard punishment in general as deserved. The doctrine of free will—the ability of man to resist temptations to evil,
which God will not permit beyond man’s capacity to resist—is central to the
Christian doctrine of salvation and damnation, heaven and hell. The postFreudian secularist, on the other hand, is more inclined to think that people are
what their history and circumstances have made them, and there is little sense in
assigning blame.85

81

Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1410–11.
HARRIS, supra note 14, at 1; see generally P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment,
available at http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/P._F._Strawson_Freedom_&_Resentment.pdf
(last visited May 13, 2015) (arguing that, regardless of whether people have free will, people
would not give up feeling and describing their “participant reactive attitudes”).
83
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (quoting Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)); see HARRIS, supra note 14, at 48.
84
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52 (1978); Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism Out of the Criminal Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2005);
HARRIS, supra note 14, at 48. However, some argue that the Court was referring to fatalism
rather than philosophical determinism. See, e.g., Richard Carrier, Free Will in American
Law: From Accidental Thievery to Battered Woman Syndrome, FREETHOUGHT BLOGS (Jul. 9,
2013), http://freethoughtblogs.com/carrier/archives/4073.
85
Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS, May 2002, at 17, 19.; accord Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the Progression
Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631, 709 (2004).
82
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In fact, the Court has at times distinguished between alternative definitions
of free will, although not explicitly. For example, in Colorado v. Connelly,86
the Court addressed when an individual’s waiver of his Miranda rights is “involuntary” under the Fifth Amendment. In this case, Francis Connelly walked
up to a police officer, “stuck out his hands in front of him and asked to be arrested.”87 When the officer asked why, Connelly confessed to a murder he had
committed a year before.88 Connelly was “neatly dressed and did not appear to
be under the influence of drugs or alcohol.”89 The police repeatedly informed
him of his Miranda rights (the right to remain silent, etc.).90 Connelly stated
that he understood his rights, but that he wished to speak about the matter anyway, as it had been weighing on his conscience.91 Unbeknownst to the police
officers at the time, Connelly suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia.92
Connelly believed that he was the reincarnation of Jesus, and that his father,
God, was commanding him to confess his prior actions through voices in his
head.93 Connelly had been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons on five separate
occasions before this incident, and was initially found incompetent to stand trial.94
The Colorado Supreme Court stated that confessions and waivers such as
Connelly’s are not “voluntary” because they are not “the product of a rational
intellect and a free will.”95 However, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument and invoked a compatibilist definition of voluntariness, stating that police coercion was necessary to defeat voluntariness and that a “mere examination of the confessant’s state of mind can never conclude the due process ininquiry.”96 The Court specifically stated that “voluntariness” under the Fifth
Amendment was “not [based] on ‘free choice’ in any broader sense of the
word,” and that typical notions of free will were inappropriate in the Miranda
waiver context.97
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, arguing that the Court had ignored “200 years of constitutional jurisprudence” by narrowly focusing on
whether the police had engaged in coercive conduct.98 However, the important
86

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
William T. Pizzi, Colorado v. Connelly: What Really Happened, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
377, 381 (2009).
88
Id.; Connelly, 479 U.S. at 160.
89
Pizzi, supra note 87.
90
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 160.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 174 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93
Id. at 174–75.
94
Id..
95
Id. at 162 (majority opinion).
96
Id. at 164–65.
97
Id. at 170.
98
Id. at 176 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent cites many previous cases where the
Court discussed whether a confession was a product of free will. Id. at 177 n.2.
87
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point this case illustrates (with respect to this Note) is that the Justices did not
disagree about what “free will” was, but rather disagreed about whether one’s
freedom of will is of constitutional significance in determining whether a confession was “voluntary.” Both the majority and dissenting opinion suggest that
to have free will, you must have the ability to choose between alternatives. Indeed, Justice Stevens stated that the majority’s argument was “incomprehensible” with regard to Connelly’s post-custodial statements, because it violated a
simple syllogism: (1) Free will is synonymous with the ability to engage in a
“free and deliberate choice;” (2) For a waiver to be voluntary, it must be the
“product of a free and deliberate choice;” (3) Therefore, a waiver is not voluntary if it isn’t the “product of . . . the defendant’s ‘free will.’ ”99
As the Supreme Court contrasts free will with its deterministic counterpart,
speaks of free will in terms of “choos[ing] between good and evil,” and holds
the criminal law as a means of punishing “abuses of free will,” it appears that
the Supreme Court generally refers to the popular conception of free will when
it uses the term, rather than any philosophically nuanced version of it.100 And
while it is not always clear what other courts mean when they use the term
“free will,” it appears that most of the time courts refer to the term as understood by the majority of people (and as defined in this Note): “whether the defendant could have done other than he did.”101
Not only do courts often acknowledge and respect a traditional notion of
free will, our laws are shaped in part by the public’s perception of free will.
Our laws are animated by our beliefs about what is right and wrong. It seems
natural to believe that “the paradigmatic case of wrongdoing is that of a free
agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and freely
choosing . . . to do wrong.”102 This intuition leads to the retributive impulse that
people should “get what they deserve,” and causes politicians to act “tough-oncrime” to gain popular support.103 Moreover, while we condemn behavior we
see as freely chosen, we excuse behavior we see as beyond the actor’s control.
And as our views change as to what actions are freely chosen, the law tends to
change with it.
For example, according to a recent Gallup poll, 47 percent of Americans
see homosexuality as something you are “born with,” compared to 33 percent

99

Id. at 173 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
See Cotton, supra note 84. On an arguably related side note, every justice that has served
on the United States Supreme Court has been religious, with the possible exception of David
Davis. See Religious Affiliation of the U.S. Supreme Court, ADHERENTS.COM,
http://www.adherents.com/adh_sc.html (last visited May 13, 2015); Bob Ritter, Does a Supreme Court Justice’s Religion Matter?, HUMANIST NETWORK NEWS (May 19,
2010),
http://americanhumanist.org/HNN/issue/details/2010-05-does-a-supreme-court-jus
tices-religion-matter.
101
Cotton, supra note 84, at 1 n.1; see supra Part I.A.
102
Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1415 (internal quotations omitted).
103
Kirchmeier, supra note 85, at 704, 725 n.334.
100
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who believe homosexuality is caused by “external factors.”104 Thirty-seven
years ago, these numbers were 13 percent and 56 percent respectively.105
FIGURE 3: GALLUP POLLING DATA ON VIEWS OF GAY/LESBIAN ORIENTATION106

It is hard not to notice that being “born that way” is another way of saying that
one’s sexual orientation is beyond his or her control, whereas attributing one’s
sexual orientation to “external factors” is a way of identifying some degree of
control or choice.107 Not surprisingly, as more Americans view homosexuality
as an immutable trait rather than a choice, they have correspondingly become
more accepting of homosexual relations108 and more accepting of same-sex
marriage.109 At least in part due to this societal change in perspective, thirtyseven states now have legal same-sex marriage, twenty-one of which have attained this status in either 2014 or 2015.110
104

Jeffrey M. Jones, More Americans See Gay, Lesbian Orientation as Birth Factor,
GALLUP (May 16, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162569/americans-gay-lesbian-orienta
tion-birth-factor.aspx.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
In a viral video, heterosexuals were asked whether they thought people chose to be gay.
The common response was that homosexuality is a mixture of both nature and nurture, a
choice that was largely informed by their upbringing and environment. However, when
asked if they chose to be straight, they all answered in the negative; this revelation would in
turn change many of their initial answers to reflect that people also do not choose to be homosexual. Radley Balko, ‘When Did You Choose To Be Straight’ Video Asks Heteros
What Gay People Are Often Asked, HUFFINGTON POST (May 10, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/10/choose-to-be-straight-video-_n_3247301.html.
108
Lydia Saad, U.S. Acceptance of Gay/Lesbian Relations Is the New Normal, GALLUP
(May 14, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154634/Acceptance-Gay-Lesbian-Rela
tions-New-Normal.aspx.
109
Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriage Support Solidifies Above 50% in U.S., GALLUP
(May 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162398/sex-marriage-support-solidifies-a
bove.aspx.
110
37 States with Legal Gay Marriage and 13 States with Same-Sex Marriage Bans,
(Apr.
17,
2015,
1:00
PM),
http://gaymarriage.procon.org
PROCON.ORG
/view.resource.php?resourceID=004857. These thirty-seven states are Alabama, Alaska, Ari-
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The subject of addiction also illustrates the influence a notion of free will
has had on our laws. Indeed, “courts are now universally unwilling to criminalize the mere status or condition of being currently addicted to an illegal drug”
due to “assumptions of free will and responsibility.”111 Suffering from an addiction is tantamount to suffering from the common cold—both are illnesses
over which the victim has no control.112 Thus, the addict’s drug dependency
should not be viewed as a moral failing, but rather as a medical condition requiring treatment.113 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that criminalizing the
“status” of being an addict would be equivalent to criminalizing someone for
being “mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease,” laws
which would “doubtless[ly] be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”114 Even proponents of free will are likely to concede limitations to the
will’s power: one does not choose to be mentally ill, and thus is not responsible
for being mentally ill. Likewise, the mentally ill are unable simply to choose to
be mentally competent, just as a blind person cannot choose to have sight.
However, some people remain skeptical about the disease model of addiction,
viewing addicts as people who could have acted otherwise but instead chose to
act poorly.115 Whether the addict is portrayed as a victim suffering from an illness or as a person who simply makes poor choices cannot help but influence
our laws, because it changes the problem society is dealing with. If crime were
viewed as a sign of underlying brain pathology, the focus shifts to helping the
afflicted and preventing future harm, rather than on determining punishment
based on the wrongful conduct.116
Most of us feel that “people evaluate their environments, make choices,
and impose those choices to the best of their ability on the world.”117 As a result, we tend to criminalize conduct and punish behavior that we view as freely
chosen. There is a significant and clear nexus between the popular conception
of free will and our willingness to hold an actor morally responsible for his
zona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. Given the rapid change over the last couple of years, this list
is likely to be inaccurate shortly after this note is published. Id.
111
R. George Wright, Criminal Law and Sentencing: What Goes with Free Will?, 5 DREXEL
L. REV. 1, 32 (2012).
112
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
113
Chris Wright, Do Addicts Have Free Will, ALTERNET (Nov. 30, 2012),
http://www.alternet.org/do-addicts-have-free-will.
114
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
115
Join Together Staff, Choice and Free Will: Beyond the Disease Model of
Addiction, PARTNERSHIP (Sept. 14, 2006), http://www.drugfree.org/join-together/addiction
/choice-and-free-will-beyond.
116
Erickson, supra note 44, at 61–62.
117
Id. at 56.
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conduct.118 When society recognizes that someone lacks the free will necessary
to choose between alternatives, we tend not to hold them as legally culpable
agents.119 As a result, “[d]rug and alcohol addicts argue that their addictions
rendered them unable to exercise free choice; defendants claim that they were
neurologically incapable of premeditating their crimes; serotonin levels are
submitted as evidence of impaired impulse control.”120 In fact, it is likely that
the number of judicial opinions drawing from neuroscience has more than doubled since 2005, with one study revealing more than 1,500 appellate judicial
opinions wherein the judge “mentioned neurological or behavioral genetics evidence that had been used as part of a defense in a criminal case.”121 Thus, the
game has become “how much can we blame you for your conduct?”
B. The Blame Game
The popular conception of free will is “embedded in the very fabric of our
system of criminal justice.”122 It can influence the elements of a crime, the defenses that can be raised, and the sentence one can receive. The role free will,
or “free choice,” plays is not subtle either. It is generally recognized that three
conditions must be satisfied in order to view an individual as blameworthy, and
thus responsible, for his or her conduct: “(1) the actor understood what she was
doing; (2) the actor understood that what she was doing was wrong; and (3) the
actor could have acted otherwise.”123 Free will is regarded as a central feature
and integral component of the retributive conception of culpability.124 The legal
arithmetic is straightforward. If your conduct was not the product of free will,
you cannot be blamed for it. And if you cannot be blamed for your conduct,
then you are relieved of responsibility.125
The commonly held notion of free will plays a part in almost every element
of a crime: the actus reus, or wrongful act, where the Model Penal Code126 re118

See Russell Dean Covey, Exorcizing Wechsler’s Ghost: The Influence of the Model Penal Code on Death Penalty Sentencing Jurisprudence, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 231–
32 (2004).
119
Erickson, supra note 44, at 55–56.
120
Kate Becker, Neuroscience, Free Will, and the Law, INSIDE NOVA (Feb. 19, 2012), http://
web.archive.org/web/20120426193545/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/insidenova/2012/02
/neuroscience-free-will-and-the-law.html; see, e.g., Hill v. Ozmint, 339 F.3d 187, 201–02
(4th Cir. 2003) (defendant argued that his aggressive impulses arose from a serotonin deficiency due to his genetics); United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(defendant argued that he was compelled to use narcotics due to his addiction).
121
Gary Stix, My Brain Made Me Pull the Trigger, SCI. AM. MIND, May/June 2014, at 14,
14; Becker, supra note 120.
122
Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1406.
123
Covey, supra note 118.
124
Id. at 230–31.
125
Id.
126
The Model Penal Code is instructive when considering the impression free will has on
our criminal law. This is because of the differences in criminal law from state to state. The
Model Penal Code was an attempt by the American Law Institute (a “non-governmental or-
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quires the act to be voluntary or the “product of the effort or determination of
the actor;”127 the mens rea, or guilty mind, where the Model Penal Code draws
distinctions between levels of culpability;128 and the determination of proximate cause, where one’s freely willed act may be seen as a superseding cause
of a crime (e.g., when the freely willed act of suicide relieves another of liability who provided that person with the means to commit suicide).129 It also informs the basic excuses within substantive criminal law, such as duress, infancy, insanity, mistake, and provocation.130 However, free will’s influence over
each of these different aspects of the criminal law boils down to one simple
concern: are you morally responsible for your conduct?
For an individual to be subject to criminal punishment, he or she must have
committed a voluntary act. Some believe that the voluntary act principle reflects the “deeply held belief that it is unfair to punish someone for engaging in
acts that are not the product of a free will.”131 However, not only does the definition of “voluntary” change depending on the legal issue at hand (e.g., voluntary act principle vs. voluntary waiver of Miranda rights); it also changes depending on the court with specific regard to the voluntary act principle.132 For
example, the Ninth Circuit has addressed the voluntary act principle, stating:
A voluntary act is one in which the individual has the ability to choose his
course of conduct. The only question is whether the person could have refrained
from doing it, or whether he was controlled by some irresistible power. If he
could have refrained, the act is voluntary; but, if he was impelled by some irresistible force, it is involuntary.133

Although this may seem like an action must be a product of free will in order to be voluntary, that is not necessarily the case. The Model Penal Code
states that a “bodily movement that . . . is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual,” is not a voluntary act.134
ganization of highly regarded judges, lawyers, and law professors”) to draft a code that states
might use in drafting their own respective criminal codes. Paul H. Robinson & Markus Dirk
Dubber, An Introduction to the Model Penal Code (Mar. 12, 1999), available at
https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf. Although there are parts of
the Model Penal Code that states have yet to adopt, it is, “more than any other code, . . . the
closest thing to being an American criminal code.” Id. at 1.
127
ELLEN S. PODGOR ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 83 (2d ed. 2009).
128
Id. at 107–08.
129
Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1413–14.
130
Covey, supra note 118, at 231; Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1406.
131
Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1412.
132
See State v. Lara, 902 P.2d 1337, 1338 (Ariz. 1995) (“We acknowledge that the word
‘voluntary’ has been used in two separate senses, and this contributes to the confusion that
surrounds the issue.”).
133
United States v. Loera, 923 F.2d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the court was addressing an instance where someone drove while intoxicated. The individual argued that the operation of the motor vehicle was not voluntary because
he became so drunk that he “[lost] the power to control his action.” The court rejected this
argument. Id.
134
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (1962) (emphasis added).
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Therefore, even if a person suffers from a brain impairment that reduces his
ability to exercise judgment (which may lead one to question whether that person has “free will”), his action may still be voluntary under the voluntary act
principle if he was relentless in pursuing his objective, demonstrating effort and
determination.135
If viewed as a corollary of free will, the voluntary act principle explains
why people are held liable for what they do, rather than who they are (e.g., acquiring or using a drug rather than being an addict, or engaging in homosexual
conduct rather than being homosexual).136 This tracks our ability to attribute
blame; while you may not be able to choose your sexual orientation (and thus,
we cannot blame/punish you for it), it seems like you are able to choose to engage in certain conduct (and therefore, we feel justified in blaming/punishing
you). The D.C. Circuit phrased it thusly:
[C]riminal responsibility is assessed only when through “free will” a man elects
to do evil, and if he is not a free agent, or is unable to choose or to act voluntarily, or to avoid the conduct which constitutes the crime, he is outside the postulate of the law of punishment.137

The voluntary act requirement protects behavior that we generally view as
not the product of effort or determination: reflexes or convulsions, conduct occurring during hypnosis, and movements during unconsciousness or sleep.138 In
fact, several individuals have been acquitted of homicide because they committed the act while sleepwalking, and thus did not act voluntarily.139 Although
many view this as protecting behavior that is not freely chosen, as one does not
choose his actions while unconscious, the current standard for what constitutes
a “voluntary act” makes legal and practical sense even without harboring a notion of free will.
In most circumstances, an individual must have the requisite mindset along
with the voluntary act in order to be found guilty of a crime.140 However, the
crime you commit, and the punishment you receive, may change depending on
the mindset with which you committed the act, despite the fact that the damage
done may be the same in each case.141 Part of the reason we punish people
135

Lara, 902 P.2d at 1338–39. Arizona’s statutory definition of voluntary act in this case is
comparable to the Model Penal Code’s definition.
136
Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1411. Of course, while sodomy laws do not violate the voluntary
act principle, they suffer from other constitutional issues. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) (striking down sodomy laws on due process grounds).
137
United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting dissenting Judge
Wright on his exposition of “established principles”).
138
PODGOR ET AL., supra note 127.
139
See generally Beth E. Teacher, Sleepwalking Used as a Defense in Criminal Cases and
the Evolution of the Ambien Defense, 1 DUQ. CRIM. L.J. 127 (2010) (detailing the history of
the sleepwalking defense in criminal cases).
140
See Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1414.
141
For example, the difference in mens rea accounts for the differences between first-degree
murder, second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. In
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based on their level of intent is because we attribute blame to them in accordance with their level of intent.142 Intentional acts appear more blameworthy, as
they are more representative of your state of mind, and thus seem to appear
more as the result of clear, conscious choice.143 If our criminal law is “based
upon a theory of punishing the vicious will,” it seems only natural to punish actions that are freely chosen more severely than those that arise by accident.144
Many defenses also touch upon a notion of free will. For example, the insanity defense is considered to “reflect[] the fundamental moral principles of
our criminal law.”145 A determination of guilt is not only a legal judgment that
the defendant “pulled a trigger, took a bicycle, or sold heroin,” but also a “moral judgment that the [defendant] is blameworthy.”146 Although the exact requirements for an insanity defense differ depending on the jurisdiction,147 in
each case the defense is allowed “not because the act was justified, but because
society cannot blame the offender for his conduct.”148 Justice Breyer has stated
that while insanity may not show the absence of mens rea, it does reveal the absence of a “vicious will.”149
The most popular test for evaluating whether a defendant was insane is the
M’Naghten test.150 This test arose in 1843, when Daniel M’Naghten shot and
killed Edward Drummond in an attempt to assassinate England’s Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel.151 Under the test, an accused is not criminally responsible
for his actions if he was, at the time of the incident, suffering from a mental
disease or defect of reason that prevented him from appreciating the nature,

each crime, the result is the unlawful killing of a human being. PODGOR ET AL., supra note
127, at 275–76.
142
Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1415.
143
However, blameworthiness does not necessarily have to scale with level of intent. For
example, some argue that a person guilty of premeditated murder may be less culpable than
one without premeditation. See Michael Vitiello, The Expanding Use of Genetic and Psychological Evidence: Finding Coherence in the Criminal Law?, 14 NEV. L.J. 897, 901–02
(2014).
144
Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1415 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Introduction to FRANCIS B. SAYRE,
A SELECTION OF CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW, at xxix, xxxvi–xxxvii (1927)).
145
United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 994 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rubin, J., dissenting).
146
Id.
147
There are four types of insanity defenses: the M’Naghten test, the irresistible impulse
test, the Durham product test, and the substantial capacity test. Each of these tests has been
adopted in at least one jurisdiction. Margaret E. Clark, The Immutable Command Meets the
Unknowable Mind: Deific Decree Claims and the Insanity Defense After People v. Serravo,
70 DENV. U. L. REV. 161, 162–63 (1992).
148
Vitiello, supra note 143, at 917.
149
Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 24 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
150
Clark, supra note 147, at 164; WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.2
(2d ed. 2003).
151
LAFAVE, supra note 150; From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crime/trial/history.html (last visited May
20, 2015). Drummond was the Prime Minister’s private secretary. LAFAVE, supra note 150.
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quality, or wrongfulness of the act.152 When an individual lacks the capacity to
distinguish between right and wrong actions, his ability to make “choices between alternative courses of action” is diminished and his reasoning is impaired.153 Punishing an individual who lacks the capacity to reason appears to
be “as undignified and unworthy as punishing an inanimate object or an animal.”154
With respect to insanity defenses generally, the D.C. Circuit has stated,
“[a] man who cannot reason cannot be subject to blame. Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame.”155 Thus,
when an individual is unable to choose his course of action—when he lacks
free will—we tend not to attribute moral responsibility or blame to him. Indeed,
many acknowledge that our criminal law revolves around the precept that “persons can be held responsible for their actions because they have freely chosen
them, rather than had them determined by forces beyond their control.”156
Necessity and duress defenses also draw upon the popular conception of
free will. Generally, an individual acts under duress if he is coerced to act “by
the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of
another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been
unable to resist.”157 In such a situation, the individual’s conduct, although made
voluntarily and intentionally, does not reveal “any semblance of a meaningful
choice.”158 An individual acts out of necessity when he or she is confronted
with a choice of two evils: committing a crime, or engaging in some other behavior that “constitutes a greater evil.”159 The Ninth Circuit contrasted necessity with duress thusly: “The theory of necessity is that the defendant’s free will
was properly exercised to achieve the greater good and not that his free will
was overcome by an outside force as with duress.”160
Although the aforementioned defenses play an important role in the guilt
phase of a criminal trial, there are free-will-based corollaries within the penalty
phase as well. Sentencing in capital cases requires the sentencer to consider a
list of mitigating factors.161 The following are all common mitigating factors
152

LAFAVE, supra note 150; Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1415–16.
Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1416 (quoting State v. Esser, 115 N.W.2d 505, 529 (Wis. 1962)
(Hallows, J., dissenting)); accord Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666 (D.C. Cir.
1945); see also United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1984) (“An acquittal by
reason of insanity is a judgment that the defendant is not guilty because, as a result of his
mental condition, he is unable to make an effective choice regarding his behavior.”).
154
Holloway, 148 F.2d at 666; see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
155
Holloway, 148 F.2d at 666–67.
156
Cotton, supra note 84, at, 1.
157
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that can render a defendant less culpable than otherwise (and the list is not exhaustive): the defendant’s age, brain damage, childhood abuse, drug addiction,
extreme mental or emotional disturbances, intoxication, substantially impaired
capacity, and mental retardation.162 Why do these factors warrant a less severe
punishment? They all tend to show that the defendant’s behavior was not freely
chosen, but rather was controlled by prior causes.163 Indeed, all of the factors
listed “relate to the development of the defendant’s brain and the idea that neurological or psychological problems show that the defendant is not as responsible as someone acting under ‘normal’ conditions.”164
Our criminal law is largely focused on whether, and to what degree, someone is responsible for his or her conduct. We have created many doctrines in
attempting to find the answer, from the general elements composing a crime to
the excuses available to criminals. Although most of these doctrines have some
utility beyond evaluating responsibility (e.g., regardless of how responsible you
are, acting under duress or out of necessity may show you to be less dangerous
than otherwise), some aspects of our criminal justice system would have to be
jettisoned or reformed, such as the theory of retribution.
C. Retribution and Legal Punishments
There are generally two ways to classify justifications for legal punishment: consequentialist justifications and retributivist justifications.165 As the
name suggests, consequentialist justifications determine the value of a punishment from its consequences.166 The principal consequentialist theories of punishment include the following: rehabilitation, which attempts to reform the offender so he will not commit future crimes; isolation, which requires
incapacitating the offender so he cannot commit crimes during the term of his
imprisonment; and deterrence, which attempts to discourage either the offender
or others in society from committing future crimes.167 If a consequentialist theory of punishment inflicts suffering upon the offender, it is not because such
suffering is justified in and of itself, but rather that such suffering leads to some
positive result.168
Conversely, retribution is the belief that “desert is a sufficient condition for
punishment.”169 In other words, punishing an offender is justified simply because the offender deserves it, regardless of the actual consequences that result
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from the punishment.170 In this sense, punishment is not a means to any positive result, but is an end in itself.171 I submit the following motto for retributivism: All else being equal, it is intrinsically better that the wrongdoer suffers
than flourishes.172 Retribution was likely the first articulated justification for
legal punishment, having been “borne out of the harsh and rigid justice of the
Old Testament.”173 In fact, retribution as a legal punishment has been traced all
the way back to the Code of Hammurabi, a Babylonian law code that predates
even the earliest writings of the Bible.174
Although the theory of retribution may seem antiquated or of little significance in modern-day sentencing, this is not the case. It is true that consequentialist justifications for punishment appeared to be the central goal of the criminal justice system during much of the twentieth century.175 In 1949, the U.S.
Supreme Court even stated that “[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals.”176 However, critics and proponents of retributivism
alike agree that it has enjoyed a striking and vigorous comeback since the early
1970s.177 Indeed, philosophers and legal scholars generally recognize retribution as the dominant theory of punishment, calling it “the leading philosophical
justification for the institution of criminal punishment,”178 and “the criminal
law’s central objective.”179
So what does retribution have to do with free will? While retributivists typically do not argue for an “eye-for-an-eye” formulation of retribution,180 they
do hold to the maxim that one should be punished in accord with his desert.181
This leads to an important question: when does someone deserve to be punished for his or her conduct? The answer relies on the popular conception of
free will: “A person deserves to suffer for doing ‘X’ if, and only if, it is fair to
blame him for having done ‘X.’ ”182 Another question arises: when is it fair to
blame someone for his or her behavior? Recall that if someone lacks free
170
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will—that is, if he or she lacks the ability to choose to act differently—we typically feel as if his or her conduct is not blameworthy (e.g., the insane, animals,
inanimate objects or events).183 Thus, without free will, retributive justifications
for punishment lose any footing, as there is no basis on which to blame people
for their actions and no sense in which one deserves to be punished.184
This will likely appear to be an absurd, or at least unappealing, conclusion
to most readers. After all, seeking vengeance against a wrongdoer seems to lie
at the core of our sense of justice,185 and retribution has its roots in “vengeance,
bloodlust, revenge, retaliation, and an eye for an eye.”186 This reaction is understandable, partly due to just how deep the desire for retribution can run. Take
Ariel Castro for example, who kidnapped three women and held them captive
in his Cleveland home for nearly a decade, during which time he repeatedly
raped them and fathered a child with one.187 The women were discovered on
May 6, 2013, when one of Castro’s neighbors heard them screaming from inside the home.188 Castro claimed that he was addicted to sex and was unable to
control his impulses.189 He pled guilty to hundreds of charges, and was sentenced to life in prison plus one thousand years.190 About a month into his sentence, Castro hanged himself in his prison cell.191
The public’s reaction to this news was telling, if not shocking. Understandably, many viewed Castro as a monster and believed he deserved to be punished for his heinous crimes.192 However, many people wanted more than justice in the legal arena; they wanted Castro to languish in prison for decades so
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he could experience as much mental and physical suffering as possible.193 Here
are some of the common reactions to Castro’s suicide from a popular forum
discussing the news (spelling and grammar in its original form): “Its great hes
dead, but it would be better if he was forced to live out the rest of his miserable
life in that hole;” “He took the easy way out. Scumbags like him don’t deserve
such simple exits;” “[O]n one hand I wish he’s alive to suffer as much as possible, but on the other hand I don’t want to waste our money on scums like him;”
“I would have gladly paid to keep a piece of shit like Castro in jail and suffering.”194
This is not to suggest that vengeance is synonymous with retribution.195
However, it is clear that both are motivated by a desire to see the offender suffer.196 The reactions to Castro’s suicide illustrate precisely why retribution is
such a strong force in our society. When someone commits a heinous crime, we
instinctively feel the need to blame him for his conduct; we feel he deserves to
suffer for his crime; and we are almost guaranteed to fail to see the true causes
of human behavior.
D. The Precarious Punishment of Retribution in Action
The contrast between our disdain for someone like Ariel Castro and our
sympathy for someone who commits a crime while apparently lacking free will
(e.g., the insane) is the result of a moral illusion that underlies our retributive
impulses. Of course, this is not the first time someone has argued against retributive punishments on philosophical grounds, and any argument would be
remiss to not mention perhaps the most famous case where the issue was
raised: the 1924 case of Leopold and Loeb.197 The nation’s press described the
193
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case as the “Crime of the Century!” Eighteen-year-old Richard Loeb and nineteen-year-old Nathan Leopold had kidnapped fourteen-year-old Bobby Franks,
murdered him, and held him for ransom on the pretense he was still alive.198
The significance of the case arises from the backgrounds of the two defendants
and the defense put on by none other than Clarence Darrow, arguably the most
famous trial lawyer in America at the time.199
Leopold and Loeb both appeared to have impeccable and fortunate backgrounds. Although in their teens, both had already attained undergraduate degrees and were set to attend law school.200 In fact, Leopold was considered a
child prodigy with an IQ of 210, and Loeb graduated college at an age where
most were juniors in high school.201 They were also the descendants of two of
Chicago’s wealthiest families: Leopold’s father was in charge of a box manufacturing business, and Loeb’s father was a lawyer who went on to become the
vice president of the department store company Sears and Roebuck.202 Given
their upstanding backgrounds, and their obvious lack of need for money, investigators likely doubted that these two could be the perpetrators of the crime.203
As it turns out, they were what many might classically think of as evil; the
two friends and lovers had spent six months carefully planning “the perfect
murder.”204 Why? “[F]or the experience.”205 It was what many would call a
“thrill kill”; they had murdered a boy just to see what it felt like.206 At trial,
there was no doubt they had committed the crime, as they had repeatedly confessed to the act.207 Indeed, if there were ever two men who deserved to be punished for their behavior, this appeared to be the case. They had no noble motive
which would mitigate their blame. They showed no remorse for their actions,
and even appeared to be proud of them. They were not insane (a sentiment even
Darrow shared). They did not have brain tumors or any other salient physical
ailment many might perceive as foreclosing their ability to exercise free will.
And to top it off, virtually all of the public and press were against them.208 As
198
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renowned English jurist William Blackstone stated, “punishments are . . . only
inflicted for abuse of that free will, which God has given to man,” and this appeared to be a simple case where two young men had chosen to abuse their free
will.209
Darrow’s goal was to have the boys sentenced to imprisonment rather than
death.210 In his efforts, Darrow delivered a twelve-hour plea that is regarded by
many as “one of the most remarkable legal arguments in the history of advocacy,”211 and that reportedly even brought the judge to tears.212 Darrow’s arguments reflected a deterministic view of human behavior.213 In essence, he argued that Leopold and Loeb could not be blamed for their childhood
development, and that they had “diseased or abnormal makeups” due to hereditary and environmental factors that were entirely beyond their control.214 Here
is an excerpt from Darrow’s final arguments:
What had this boy to do with it? He was not his own father; he was not his
own mother; he was not his own grandparents. All of this was handed to him.
He did not surround himself with governesses and wealth. He did not make himself. And yet he is to be compelled to pay.
There was a time in England . . . when judges used to . . . call juries to try a
horse, a dog, a pig, for crime. . . . Animals were tried. Do you mean to tell me
that Dickie Loeb had any more to do with his making than any other product of
heredity that is born upon the earth?215

In the end, Darrow succeeded, and Leopold and Loeb were sentenced to life in
prison plus ninety-nine years.216
Darrow’s reasoning has been echoed many times since then. One recent
example occurred on June 15, 2013, when sixteen-year-old Ethan Couch
drunkenly drove into several people standing by the side of a road with his Ford
F-350 pickup truck, killing four and injuring others.217 On December 10 of that
209
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same year, Ethan was sentenced to ten years of probation for his actions.218
How was Ethan able to avoid imprisonment for his crime? It just so happens,
Ethan suffered from “affluenza,” or so his lawyers claimed.219 The defense’s
argument took the following form: Ethan was a spoiled child whose wealthy
parents gave him everything he wanted (e.g., motorcycles, cars, money, etc.)
and never taught him that “sometimes you don’t get your way.”220 Because
Ethan had been raised to believe he could always do what he wanted, he had
grown up “emotionally flat.” Therefore, he could not be responsible for behavior that resulted from his stunted upbringing.221 While it is not clear that the
judge bought the argument hook, line, and sinker, the sentence suggests that the
argument was effective.222
If someone is not responsible for his or her actions, a harsh retributive punishment seems inappropriate. However, since notions of moral responsibility
and blame rest on a cognitive illusion, we will continually be struggling to
identify when someone is or is not responsible for his behavior.223 The unfortunate case of Patricia (“Patty”) Hearst is demonstrative.
In 1974, nineteen-year-old Patty Hearst, the granddaughter of newspaper
magnate William Randolph Hearst, was kidnapped in the middle of the night
from her apartment, forced into the trunk of a car, and imprisoned in a closet
for fifty-seven days where she was blindfolded and repeatedly raped and tortured.224 Her captors were members of the Symbionese Liberation Army
(“SLA”), a radical left-wing organization determined to enact a proletarian revolution that would bring down the “capitalist state.”225 The SLA hoped to bring
media attention to the group to help facilitate its goals.226 While in captivity,
the SLA attempted to “brainwash” Patty by subjecting her to “an unrelenting
campaign of mental cruelty, sensory deprivation, malnutrition, threats of death
and injury, and the constant confusion of affection and abuse.”227 Their efforts
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paid off: Patty Hearst, reborn as “Tania,” joined the SLA in committing several
crimes, most notably a bank robbery in San Francisco.228 She even stated in
taped messages that she had willingly given up her previous lifestyle, that she
had not been “brainwashed, drugged, torture[d], hypnotized, or in any way confused,” and that she was committed to fighting alongside her captors.229 The
police found her in an apartment in San Francisco on September 18, 1975, and
charged her with robbery, kidnapping, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault with intent to commit murder.230
The case seemed to revolve around one question: did Patty Hearst freely
choose to join the SLA and participate in the crimes (an exercise of free will
that would render her blameworthy, and thus deserving of punishment), or was
she forced to participate due to either duress or indoctrination (circumstances
that would have impaired her free will, and thus relieved her of responsibility)?231 In confronting this question, one of the government’s expert witnesses
stated, “I think she entered that bank voluntarily in order to participate in the
robbing of that bank. This was an act of her own free will.”232 The jury agreed
and found her guilty.233 The judge, in rejecting the argument that her unfortunate circumstance should serve as a mitigating factor, sentenced her to seven
years of imprisonment.234 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling,
and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.235
The public’s attitude towards Patty Hearst is fascinating. Initially, most
people strongly detested Patty Hearst, considering her a “spoiled brat” that
might get off the hook because she was the wealthy heiress of a famous family
(a sentiment oddly similar to that expressed towards Ethan today).236 In fact,
polling data reveals that in 1975, about 90 percent of the general public believed she was responsible for her actions and that she should be sentenced to
prison.237 However, over the course of several years, the public grew sympathetic, developing a “widespread visceral sense that a young, impressionable
girl who was unduly influenced by her kidnappers is somehow not entirely responsible for her acts.”238 Eventually, President Carter commuted her sentence,
228
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stating that Patty had only joined the SLA because of the horrific personal experiences she had endured, and thus she did not deserve her punishment.239 In
2001, President Clinton granted her a full pardon.240
These cases illustrate one of the major problems with retribution: it concentrates a court’s attention on unfounded and confused metaphysical notions
of desert and blame (i.e., issues like who is blameworthy, how blameworthy are
they, how responsible were they for their conduct, etc.), rather than on how best
to protect everyone from future harm. Imagine that we had the knowledge and
tools to help someone like Leopold or Loeb. What if there was an hour-long
procedure they could undergo that would completely restore their sense of empathy and compassion for other human beings to the degree of that of a normal
person? Would it make any moral sense to kill them or jail them for life when
this procedure exists?241 Or what about Whitman? Had he not committed suicide and his brain tumor was discovered, would he have deserved to suffer with
his brain tumor for the remainder of his life?242 Or imagine an extreme version
of the Patty Hearst case: if I were able to take full control of your mind and
force you to commit a crime, would you deserve to be punished for it? Would
you deserve to have me remain at the controls?
The theory of retribution rests on the public’s erroneous conception of free
will, and perpetuates a moral confusion. Furthermore, by instituting retribution
as a legitimate punishment, we waste our scientific and legal efforts on creating
spurious distinctions in responsibility when we should be evaluating the efficacy of, and enhancing, our other theories of punishment.243 Thus, as Roscoe
Pound wrote in 1922, “in order to deal with crime in an intelligent and practical
manner we must give up the retributive theory.”244
III. A WORLD WITHOUT FREE WILL
A. Could We Still Adequately Punish Criminals?
This Note has argued that the popular conception of free will is an illusion,
and that its widespread acceptance has influenced our law and legal structure in
a deleterious manner, especially with regard to retribution. These arguments are
by no means generally accepted,245 and it is very likely that many readers may
have concerns regarding this proposal. This section will attempt to address
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these concerns, and reassure the reader that no major reformation of our government or way of life is required in a world without free will.
One of the most common reactions to the idea that humans lack free will,
and thus cannot be blamed for their behavior, is the belief that we are then under an obligation to free all criminals from confinement and that all basis for
punishing criminals is lost. As Judge Evelle Younger stated, “If society is
wholly responsible, why not apologize to the cutthroat and pension him for
life? If you don’t hang him, why imprison him? He surely needs neither gallows nor cell if the blame is all on the universe at large.”246 In terms of retributive punishments, this is true. There is no sense in which one deserves to be
hanged or deserves to be incarcerated. However, consequentialist punishments
do not rely on notions of free will, blame, or moral responsibility.247 Regardless
of whether you freely choose to act, punishing you may: (1) deter you (or others) from committing similar conduct and harming others; (2) reform you so
you are less likely to commit similar conduct and harm others, or; (3) incapacitate you so you are unable to commit similar conduct and harm others.248 As
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. phrased it in a letter to British political theorist
Harold Laski:
If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have hanged . . .
I should say, I don’t doubt that your act was inevitable for you but to make it
more avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the common good. You
may regard yourself as a soldier dying for your country if you like. But the law
must keep its promises.249

To illustrate the utility of punishments in the absence of free will, again, an
analogy to animals seems appropriate. When a bear escapes a zoo and roams
the streets, thereby endangering everyone nearby, we typically do not think of
the bear as freely choosing its behavior.250 Rather, most of us recognize that a
bear has no choice except to act in accord with its genetically derived instincts.251 Nonetheless, this does not, and should not, prevent us from recognizing the real threat the bear poses to others and taking action accordingly.252
Capturing and confining the bear seems like an ideal solution; reforming the
bear so it became as friendly as a domesticated dog would be even better if it
were possible.
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The value incapacitation serves regardless of the existence of free will
seems rather self-evident; regardless of the true origins of human behavior,
locking you up will prevent you from harming others in open society.253 However, the value of deterrence in a world without free will seems to merit special
attention, as many legal scholars and courts are under the impression that deterrence, like retribution, would cease to be an effective legal punishment.254 The
argument is as follows: “deterrence can only be effective where the actor can
consider the consequences of her acts and make a rational choice to refrain
from the act because of the threat of punishment,” and thus “the only truly deterrable acts are ones that are also freely chosen.”255 After all, the bear from the
previous example certainly seems undeterrable, so one might wonder why a
human would be any different.
There is a point to this argument: not all behavior is effectively deterrable.
Involuntary behavior, or behavior that occurs without the felt intention of carrying it out (e.g., shivering, yawning, sleepwalking, sneezing, etc.), would be difficult to deter.256 However, the idea that voluntary behavior cannot be deterred
without free will is simply false, and a negative relationship between punishment and crime rate is compatible with a deterministic view of human behavior.257 In theory, all that is required for deterrence to be effective is that the actor is capable of understanding the potential consequences of his conduct, and
that the actor can be influenced by that understanding.258 If we could successfully communicate to all bears that they will be hunted down and killed the
moment they attack any human (i.e., if bears were capable of understanding
what that meant), many bears probably would be deterred from attacking humans. While it is impossible to communicate in this way to bears, no such
problem exists with regard to humans.
253
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Even though people are theoretically capable of being deterred, the degree
to which they actually are deterred by certain punishments is a legitimate question that has drawn much attention, yet remains largely inconclusive.259 This is
largely due to the difficulty in accurately identifying the causal relationship between a change in punishment (e.g., an increase in sentence length), and the deterrent effect.260 However, there is less of a debate on whether incarceration has
some deterrent effect on the general population, and more of a debate as to the
extent of the deterrent effect.261 There are generally two ways in which punishments deter behavior. First, they influence our understanding of how certain
we are to be punished (e.g., if the police department always has an officer
watching a certain street for speeding, and the public knows this, chances are
fewer people will speed on that street).262 Second, they influence our understanding of how severely we will be punished (e.g., the rationale underlying
mandatory minimum sentences and “three-strikes” laws).263 Although the efficacy of changing the certainty and severity of various punishments in deterring
behavior is an open question for the sciences, attempting to find moral ways of
increasing the deterrent effect of various punishments is a legitimate project regardless of the underlying causes of human behavior. Furthermore, an argument that deterrence is an ineffective justification for legal punishment is a non
sequitur if used to show that retribution is either moral or justified as a legal
punishment. The same is true concerning the efficacy of rehabilitative programs.
Deterrence also merits special attention because people often conflate determinism with fatalism.264 The confusion arises from the following faulty logic: “if everything is determined, then law cannot affect people’s behavior because they are already destined to engage in whatever behavior they do engage
in.”265 This is the view the government’s attorney took in the case against Leopold and Loeb, declaring that under Darrow’s philosophy, “there ought not to
be any law and there ought not to be any enforcement of the law.”266 However,
this is simply not the case. Actions are not “destined” to arise, regardless of
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previous conditions and circumstances. On the contrary, actions arise as a direct result of previous conditions and circumstances.
To help demonstrate the point, imagine the following hypothetical. Imagine that you have been pulled over for speeding (or, if you actually have been
pulled over for speeding, reflect on that moment). Were you destined to be
pulled over at that moment, regardless of what laws existed at the time? What if
there had been a widely known and frequently enforced law that made the penalty for speeding death by guillotine? Would you have still gone over the speed
limit? Even if you would have, would everyone else?
There is no “destiny” that transcends causation. This is precisely why we
have laws—to encourage people to do things they might not otherwise do in
absence of the law, and to deter people from engaging in certain conduct they
might otherwise engage in without the law. The law really does affect behavior.
“[I]ndividuals do tend to buy less candy when the price rises and steal fewer
televisions when the penalty increases.”267 Thus, deterrence (like incapacitation
and rehabilitation) is a valid justification for punishment even in the absence of
free will.
B. How Much Would Have to Change?
Many believe that something important about our subjectivity would be
lost without the conventional notion of free will. Legally, many worry that,
without some form of retribution, any alternative efforts to meet a victim’s
needs would be inadequate. Psychologically, many worry that we would be
rendered mere “meat machines” or “meat computers” without free will, and
thus much of the magic and beauty of our experience would be unfounded.268
However, recognizing the true causes of human behavior need not diminish our
experiences or irreparably harm our system of punishment.
One reason many find retribution to be a necessary justification for punishment is that the victims of various crimes (and often, the family and friends
of the victims) need the psychological satisfaction of observing the punishment
of an offender, and that alternatives would not adequately meet this need.269
This is an interesting point, as most of us have experienced a powerful, if not
overwhelming, desire for revenge, whether it be from a real life event or from
empathizing with characters from works of fiction.270 However, this argument
is not a justification for retribution. If we implemented punishments due to this
concern, we would not be punishing offenders because they deserved it; rather,
267
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we would be punishing offenders because of the beneficial consequences that
result from such punishments (e.g., the emotional and psychological satisfaction of the victims). Thus, such punishments would have a consequentialist justification, not a retributive one.
Nevertheless, this consequentialist justification for punishment is also
problematic. Aside from merely establishing a “sham form of retribution,” it
merely perpetuates the deeper problem; most people do not understand the underlying causes of human behavior, and this misunderstanding leads to unnecessary anguish and bitterness.271 Victims often desire retribution and revenge
because of the illusion of free will. We should not be encouraging or indulging
these desires on an institutional level; we should be exposing their fallacious
underpinnings. In fact, recognizing the true causes of human behavior and disposing of desires for revenge can be psychologically beneficial. For example,
in 2006, when Charles Roberts barricaded himself within an Amish schoolhouse, tied up ten young girls, and systematically shot each one before taking
his own life, the community reacted in the most inspiring way.272 Rather than
living with hatred and bitterness from the event, they showed nothing but love
and forgiveness for the killer and his family.273 They even attended the killer’s
funeral.274 Notably, Roberts had apparently been “acting out in revenge for
something that happened [twenty] years ago.”275 This reveals a striking and instructive contrast: while Roberts had been overwhelmed by anger due to an
event that occurred twenty years ago, the community did not spend a single day
harboring such caustic thoughts.276 Which mindset would you rather live with,
a mind riddled with hate or one that is at ease?
Another concern many have with the idea that humans lack free will is that
such a thesis would force us to abandon many of our natural reactive attitudes
(e.g., “regret, resentment, blame, praise, love”) and that such an abandonment
is utterly unappealing or would entirely strip our lives of meaning.277 Therefore, many feel that we must continue to live and act as if we have free will, regardless of whether we do in fact have it.278 There are several ways to address
this concern. First, it must be conceded that some of these reactive attitudes
271
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would need to be relinquished.279 However, attitudes such as resentment and
antipathy underlie our desires to blame and condemn others for their conduct.
These sentiments only give rise to vitriol analogous to the reactions to Ariel
Castro’s suicide mentioned earlier.280 It is hard to see what appreciable loss
would arise if we no longer shared these sentiments, and doing so would likely
foster a more compassionate society, where we focus on helping and treating
others rather than blaming them. Additionally, we would not be rendered insensate without free will. Not all of our emotions and reactive attitudes are dependent upon our viewing others as conscious agents who are able to behave
differently. Indeed, emotions such as love and fear would be unaffected by the
loss of free will.281
Secondly, the realistic goal is not to rid each and every individual of his or
her sense of free will.282 Even those who believe free will is an illusion often
develop the urge to blame others for their conduct.283 Rather, the goal is to create a criminal justice system that transcends the moral failings of the individual.
If we cease to recognize retributive justifications for punishment as legitimate,
our day-to-day reactive attitudes would be largely unaffected. Noticeable
change would only occur within the legal sphere, where we could attempt to
avoid outcomes driven by a notion of free will, such as Patty Hearst’s conviction. This is something worth striving for, not something to be concerned about.
Our system of criminal justice is no less important in a world without free
will. Regardless of whether you freely chose to commit a crime, we still need to
know whether it was you who in fact committed the crime, and what risk you
pose to others in the future. Our substantive criminal law would not need to undergo substantial changes either. Rather, we would merely alter the way in
which we describe much of it. A “voluntary act” would be an act that is accompanied by the felt intention of carrying it out, rather than one that is the result of
free choice.284 We could still distinguish between someone who committed a
crime intentionally and someone who did so negligently; we simply would not
279
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view the offenders as more or less blameworthy, but rather as more or less likely to perpetrate future harm. We could recognize that persons who act out of
necessity, or under duress, are less of a threat to society without being bogged
down by questions of whether the actor had free will or whether his will was
overborne. We could acknowledge that there is a continuum of possible mental
stability, defined by the stable majority on one end and the classically “insane”
on the other, without engaging in some sort of responsibility calculus.285 We
could recognize that those at the “insane” end of the spectrum may pose more
of a threat to society, and thus require special attention with regard to punishment. However, our sympathy would go out not only to the “insane,” but also
to the Leopold and Loeb types, whose genetics have placed them among their
ranks.286
In fact, our language need not even change. Statements like “I chose,” “he
decided,” and “you should have” are still useful in a world without free will.
Saying, “I went to Baskin Robbins and chose chocolate ice cream,” simply
states that while you were at Baskin Robbins, you understood that there were
several different flavors of ice cream, reasons were coming to you that were
making certain flavors more appealing than others, and that you ended up selecting chocolate for one reason or another. Although in a deeper, philosophical
sense you did not have the capacity to “choose” a different flavor, saying that
you chose a certain flavor still accurately reflects your mindset at that time.
Saying, “You should have chosen vanilla; that’s their best flavor,” simply
means that you think he would have been happier if the state of the universe
had been slightly different in a way that led him to select vanilla, and that perhaps he should do so in the future. It need not imply that you actually had the
capacity to bring about the other scenario in the past.
Most concerns about the deleterious effects of a world without free will are
exaggerated or confused. A sweeping overhaul of our criminal justice system
would not be necessary (or even desirable), and our subjective experience
would be no less important or valuable. In fact, recognizing the true causes of
human behavior would likely lead to a more compassionate society, where we
are no longer encumbered by a desire to see others suffer.
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CONCLUSION
In 1909, Roscoe Pound made clear what many are unwilling to accept today: “[O]ur criminal law is so rooted in theological ideas of free will and moral
responsibility and juridical ideas of retribution, and both criminal law and procedure are so thoroughly mechanical, that we by no means make what we
should of our [scientific] discoveries.”287 He considered our criminal law to be
“the most archaic part of our legal system.”288 Although his words are now over
one hundred years old, they are as true today as they were then.
Philosophically, this Note does not suggest that strict determinism is
true.289 Rather, this Note argues that the libertarian notion of free will is false.
We simply do not have the ability to control the content or arrival of our
thoughts, and thus, there is no sense in which we could have chosen to behave
differently in the past. As most people believe that we do have this freedom of
will, the notion has largely shaped our criminal law and societal attitude towards punishable behavior. Most significantly, we feel that offenders deserve
to be punished when they engage in behavior that is a product of their free will.
This feeling is the result of a cognitive illusion, and validating a theory of retribution only perpetuates this confusion by shifting our legal focus from assessing risks to society, to assessing blameworthiness.
Fortunately, a legal recognition that we do not have free will would not require drastic changes to our day-to-day life or to our system of criminal justice.
The legal parlance surrounding our substantive criminal law would change in
some respects, but a total abolition of the doctrines that may touch upon a notion of free will (e.g., actus reus, mens rea, insanity, duress, necessity, etc.)
would be far from necessary. However, retribution as a valid theory of punishment must be forgone. Fortunately, since the common conception of free will
fosters our desire to hate and blame others, the long-term consequences of abolishing the theory of retribution would have a salutary effect upon our system of
criminal justice and society in general. At some time, we must recognize that
our metaphysical notions of free will, blame, and moral responsibility do not
make scientific or moral sense—this Note submits that now is as a good a time
as any.
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